

Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades by John B. Wilson, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1998. 469 pages. \$36.00, hardcover.

Of the division, Sir William Slim in his 1956 book, *Defeat Into Victory*, wrote that the division is "the smallest formation that is a complete orchestra of war and the largest in which every man can know you." Of course, the division as a military unit is a complex organization designed for independent and sustained combat operations, but its history in the U.S. Army has not always been easy or even well understood.

The Army Lineage Series, sponsored by the U.S. Army's Center of Military History in Washington, D.C., has now produced a comprehensive history of the evolution of army divisions and separate brigades in this lengthy and detailed publication. The author, John Wilson, worked as an army historian for 31 years, and actually completed this book seven years ago. To cover the gap from completion to publication, he has added a very brief chapter on divisional organization in Desert Storm, along with an allusion to the future. This is a government publication. There is no International Stock Book Number (ISBN), so you will not be ordering this through your local bookstore. Copies may be obtained through the Superintendent of Documents at (202) 512-1800.

Divisions have been around the Army for more than 200 years, but the early theorists and commanders had the same divisional problems in George Washington's army as in today's army - how to combine combat arms, combat support, and combat service support into a balanced, efficient fighting unit capable of independent operations in a wide variety of conditions. That sounds like an easy task, but as Wilson so deliberately reveals, it was anything but easy. Wilson's study clearly shows that the army division is now, and always has been, a work in progress.

From the American Revolution to the 1990s (and certainly on into the 21st century) the combat division has been a fluid organization whose structure seems to be constantly changing. Ideally, the structure of a division must certainly reflect its combat mission (infantry, armor, airborne, etc.) with firepower, mobility, maneuverability, and sustainability as key ingredients. Other factors, however, much beyond its control have had the greatest impact on the evolution of the division as a fighting organization.

Terrain, tactics, the theater of operation, and the enemy have always influenced division organizational structure, but technology, politics, and economic limitations have also weighed in heavily on how the U.S. Army would organize its divisions. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the size of a division was most often limited to the span of control of a commander who could see all his forces from atop a horse. It was thought that "the management of 2,000 men in the field was ample duty for a brigadier general." In the 20th century, divi-

sions assumed a combined arms pose, with artillery being added to infantry divisions, armor and motorized units replacing cavalry. Size varied from 11,000 soldiers to 28,000, depending on which war, which peacetime interval, or which visionary drew up the plan. Cost was a huge player, with many divisions looking great on paper, but not manned or equipped as advertised. Sadly, politics too influenced smart decision-making. During World War I, National Guard forces were formed by state-based on a patronage formula of 800 men for each U.S. Senator and Congressman.

However, tinkering with divisional structures needed to be an ongoing process as innovations (ours and the enemy's) changed the face of every war, and Wilson's study covers all the divisional evolutions from the War of 1812, to the Pentomic Divisions of 1955, the "flexible response," the AirLand Battle, and the 1980's "Army of Excellence." He includes both the sound concepts and the silly proposals that were "completely unacceptable intellectually and scientifically."

The history of the separate brigades is much shorter, since they were officially established during the period of 1961-65 as a spinoff of the ROAD, "Reorganization Objective Army Divisions." At that time, the Army determined that it needed separate brigades "for unique missions not appropriate for a division," to be task organized for special purposes. Airborne, jungle, and arctic roles appear to have been special mission considerations.

There is a lot of detailed material in this history, and it serves more as a definitive reference book than as entertaining reading. That said, however, it is well-researched, amply supported by photos and charts, and is clearly presented in a very usable and informative manner, especially for the scholar and student of military history.

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Vietnam Military Lore: Legends, Shadows and Heroes by Ray Bows, Bows and Sons, Hanover, Mass., 1998. xv + 1180 pp. Maps, photographs, glossary. \$50.00.

Readers interested in a soldier's eye view of war rather than an intellectually detached analysis of it are likely to find *Vietnam Military Lore: Legends, Shadows and Heroes* hard to put down. Each of the 53 brief chapters is the story of an American fighting man, the principal focus being on those who were killed in Southeast Asia between 1945 and 1965. Relying mainly on personal correspondence and interviews with friends and relatives of the fallen, Ray Bows, a retired career NCO and Vietnam veteran, fills in many of the gaps left by the conventional "history from the top down" approach. Save for the brief write-ups that accompanied commendations, little of this lore was part of the public record and Bows is

rightly determined that the warriors not be forgotten. But, although an army attracts all types, the author's "heroes" usually fit a definite profile. They are idealistic, patriotic, competent and, of course, blessed with supreme physical courage. Overwhelmed by the book's numerous accounts of noble sacrifice and uneven odds, one cannot help but see thematic parallels with Homer and Herodotus.

But celebrations of courage do not in and of themselves constitute balanced assessments of cause, conduct, or effect, and this collection of anecdotes offers little else. Like many a Vietnam veteran, the historical profession has itself only recently begun to come to terms with U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. Until Shelby Stanton's *The Rise and Fall of an American Army* first appeared in 1985, readers who sought to know more than one side of the controversy were left to steer an uncertain course among white paper white-washes, journalistic lynchings, and grunt's-eye view reminiscences, many of which engaged or enraged, but none of which brought "closure."

The author's "worm's eye view" (p. ii), which often emphasizes the betrayal of the American soldier by the South Vietnamese — and by his own superiors — does not bring closure, either. True, one can still welcome this work as a counterpoise to politically motivated left-of-center distortions of the historical record, and no qualified critic would dare suggest that U.S. policy makers were uniformly competent or honest. Nevertheless, *Vietnam Military Lore* breaks no new interpretive ground, and it suffers from an imbalance every bit as pronounced as that inherent in the impersonal academic analyses it seeks to augment. While roundly lambasting the corruption inherent in virtually every level of Vietnamese society as well as the moral cowardice and high living of some senior American officials, the author seems less eager to apply his indictment of moral backsliding within the lower ranks. When "heroes" look the other way while their Vietnamese advisees torture other Vietnamese, they seem to lose little of their moral superiority, and the reader is thus left to dismiss either the act or the actor.

Poor copy editing will also frustrate the reader. The author's occasional references to America's earlier wars occasion several misspellings, e.g., "Bastone" for Bastogne (p. 381) and "Craig" for Krag (p. 1064). Perhaps most serious of all, despite heavy reliance on personal correspondence and interviews, Bows is not always content to let the sources speak for themselves, preferring instead to summarize with editorials of his own. Comprehensive footnotes and complete bibliographic entries for the archival sources would also have helped. Their absence, like the absence of an objective purpose, obscures part of the truth: Legends, by definition, are unhistorical, unverifiable, exaggerated stories. Bows' most memorable vignettes, by contrast, are merely accounts of ordinary men caught up in extraordinary circumstances.

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Fighting the Desert Fox: Rommel's Campaigns in North Africa April 1941 to August 1942 by John Delaney, Arms & Armour Press, London, England, 1998, 160 pages, 200 b/w illustrations, 16 maps; \$29.95, hardcover.

Is there a need for yet another book on the North African campaign of the Second World War? The exploits of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and his renowned Afrika Korps have long captured the interest of military historians and amateur enthusiasts alike. In many ways, North Africa was the noblest theater of the war due to the absence of a significant civilian population, occasional chivalry on both sides and exciting sweeps of armored formations against a rather exotic backdrop. John Delaney argues convincingly that there is indeed more to be learned about this important military campaign.

Monographs dealing with the subject have generally focused on either the successes of the British army in North Africa or the abilities of Erwin Rommel. Delaney instead takes a different approach and focuses on the time frame that witnessed the weakest Allied performance, the period that saw the first arrival of substantial German forces under the command of Rommel until the time Montgomery took control of the British 8th Army in August of 1942. Delaney's thesis is not new or controversial. He suggests that the British, under a debilitating succession of commanders, were largely unsuccessful against Rommel because of their ineffective command structure and poor tactical leadership. While Rommel outmaneuvered and outfought the Allies, the various British commanders that faced him never capitalized upon his weakest area: logistics. The British did not achieve real success against the Germans until Montgomery took command and implemented a cautious and deliberate war of attrition. It is not Delaney's thesis that is new but rather his area of emphasis. Delaney does not gloss over the military shortcomings of either the British or the Germans, but instead he devotes greater attention to their respective deficiencies during this often-neglected period of the war.

Each of the book's seven chapters is able to stand as an independent essay in which the relative strengths of the Axis and Allies are analyzed as the North African campaign unfolds. Chapter Four, "Operation 'Crusader,'" which covers the only major British success of the period, is the most insightful of all. Balance is the theme that persists throughout the book as Delaney emphasizes the joint nature of both forces. The alliance of the Germans and the Italians made military cooperation extremely difficult for the Axis, but the Allies arguably faced an even greater challenge due to complications posed by multinational forces. Though allied forces in North Africa were united under British command, there were military units from Britain, South Africa, India, Australia, New Zealand, France, Poland and even Czechoslovakia. For the British to pull together a coordinated effort was a remarkable accomplishment.

A telling example of the book's objective manner is demonstrated by Delaney's balanced treatment of the Italian army — not an easy task. While the military performance of the Italians is justifiably criticized, the author makes clear the consequences of poor leadership and equipment on the fighting ability of otherwise quite capable troops. For his part, Rommel is not spared criticism either. Although Delaney is clearly impressed with the Desert Fox's abilities, the author rightly faults him for becoming carried away with his success and vastly overextending his logistical support.

Overall, the book is indeed a welcome addition because of its novel focus on a less-than-flattering period of British military history even though the larger topic has already received extensive investigation. The book is profusely illustrated with many excellent photographs and good maps, but that does not mark it as simply another collection of photographs geared towards military enthusiasts. The insight and analysis offered make it a work of genuine historical scholarship, something of value to the historian and military professional alike. On the other hand, the absence of footnotes and a bibliography are a serious omission. Other minor factual errors, such as improperly identifying General Friedrich Paulus as "von Paulus," are annoying but do not diminish the importance of the work as a whole. Overall, the work's weaknesses are greatly outweighed by its strengths. Most importantly, Delaney's book ably explains the British failures which preceded the ultimate victory of the Allies in North Africa and helps make clear what later went right for the Allies and what went wrong for the Axis. *Fighting the Desert Fox* is a welcome addition to an important area of military history.

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Royal Scots in the Gulf: 1st Battalion The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) on Operation Granby, 1990-1991 by Laurie Milner, Leo and Cooper: London, 1998. 185 pages, maps, bibliography, index, glossary; \$28.

Laurie Milner's *Royal Scots in the Gulf* is a dramatic account of Britain's oldest infantry regiment in action during Operation Granby, known to Americans as Operation Desert Storm. Because most of the official British documents relating to this conflict are still classified, the author elected to use interviews and private diaries as the basis of the book. Milner begins with a brief overview of events that led to the commitment of allied forces to Southwest Asia and describes how the Royal Scots deployed there. He then examines the battalion's performance in combat operations and its redeployment to Germany.

According to Milner, the Royal Scots were at a high state of readiness when Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait. They had recently excelled during several tactical exercises, had high morale, and possessed the most modern equipment in the British Army.

However, the unit soon faced the many logistical and operational challenges of deploying a mechanized infantry force to a combat theater. Vehicles needed to be repainted in appropriate desert camouflage, vehicle crews had to be validated in various gunnery tasks, and the battalion had to make the mental transition from fighting in the restrictive terrain of Western Europe to conducting combat operations in the open desert of Southwest Asia.

Upon arriving in Saudi Arabia, the Royal Scots embarked on an intensive training schedule. Section and squad leaders stressed individual tasks such as first aid, vehicle evacuation drills, and individual marksmanship. Collective training focused on platoon- and company-level attacks, direct fire planning, and breaching operations.

In many ways, *Royal Scots in the Gulf* reads much like a "lessons learned" report from the National Training Center. The battalion had trouble evacuating casualties, navigating at night, and was often unable to integrate maneuver forces and fire support assets. Milner describes the confusion leaders faced when they lost control of dismounted elements during the two hasty attacks conducted by the Royal Scots. Only the strong leadership of noncommissioned officers and the discipline of individual riflemen prevented tragedy.

The experience of these Scottish troops often paralleled those of American units in Southwest Asia. Because of this, the "golden nugget" in Milner's book is not the narrative, but the question the text raises: Have American and British ground forces solved the problems identified during the Persian Gulf War? Although the United States Army has addressed several of these problems at the various combat training centers, a fundamental flaw has been ignored: American mechanized forces still lack adequate radios that provide secure voice communication between dismounted infantry and their carriers. Without this equipment, leaders cannot effectively maneuver their platoons, exposing their soldiers, especially dismounted infantrymen, to an increased risk of fratricide.

Royal Scots in the Gulf is an exciting tale of personal courage under fire by members of this proud regiment. Milner does an excellent job of harnessing the commotion of this short, but violent, conflict as seen through the eyes of its participants. Additionally, it allows today's leaders to reexamine many of the problems experienced during the Persian Gulf War to ensure that proper corrective measures have been taken.

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Military Geography For Professionals and the Public by John M. Collins, Brassey's, Inc., Dulles, Va., 1998, 450 pages, \$32.95, paperback.

John M. Collins is a retired U.S. Army colonel who began his 30-year career in 1942 as a private. He later earned a master's in geography. He has also served as a senior special-

ist in National Defense at the Library of Congress and is currently a Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University. He has written ten previous books, some of which have been translated into five languages. His explanation of the military aspects of physical and political geography is a demonstration of his 56 years of military and scholarly experience.

The author's opening quote is from B.H. Liddell Hart's book, *Thoughts on War*, and states:

"When a Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote that he had 'never had time to study the details of military [geography]'... it was as if the President of the Royal College of surgeons said he never had time to study anatomy, or do any dissection."

This quote cuts quickly to the major premise of *Military Geography*; the understanding of terrain and its impact on military forces is at the very foundation of the profession of arms. The author identifies three purposes for the book:

- To provide a textbook for academic use
- To provide a handbook for use by political-military professionals
- To enhance public appreciation for the impact of geography on military affairs.

Military Geography does an excellent job meeting these purposes. This is not a book that will provide tremendous insight into OCOKA, but is broader in scope. It is divided into four parts: Part One – Physical Geography; Part Two – Cultural Geography; Part Three – Political-Military Geography, and Part Four – Area Analyses. Part One puts a military spin to what would otherwise be similar to most geography textbooks. The other three sections demonstrate the unique nature of this volume. I found the information about air and naval operations and the geographic constraints to be among the most interesting.

In Part Three, the author explains the history of the unified command system currently used by the U.S. military. This proved extremely useful to understand why the commands have the geographic responsibilities they currently possess and what geographic, political, and military issues may force changes in the future. The final section discusses two specific cases where a geographic area analysis was conducted and how it affected the operation: Operation NEPTUNE (D-Day Landings) and Operation Plan EL PASO (attack to block the Ho Chi Minh trail — never executed).

This book is written like a textbook and, therefore, has some dry portions, but overall it is extremely interesting. The information has importance not simply to civilian scholars or national level strategists, but to Armor/Cavalry soldiers as well. The importance of geography directly influences all military operations — either where they are fought, why they are fought in a specific location, or how each side may conduct operations. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the profession of

arms. It is a great resource and opens our eyes to the importance of all aspects of geography.

Major General Alden Sibley tells us that "...young officers of all services must learn terrain or learn the language of the conqueror." This guidance alone is a good reason to read this book.

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The Battle of the Bulge – Britain's Untold Story by Charles Whiting, Sutton Publishing Ltd., Phoenix Mill, Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2BU, 210 pages, hardback, \$34.95, ISBN 0 7509 1869 1

The Battle of the Bulge is remembered in popular history as "von Runstedt's offensive," for the "Battered Bastards of Bastogne," and for Patton's drive to raise the siege. It began with American forces being caught by surprise and pushed back, only to take the offensive and win a great victory. As with many well-known notions, the full truth is not always what people believe. The offensive was the work of Field Marshal Model, not von Runstedt, and while Bastogne was heavily invested, it was never completely surrounded. Patton certainly moved his armies to face the German attack, and indeed started that move before the attack began.

Less well known is the part played by British ground and air forces in the campaign, and the fact that for some time American troops were commanded by Britain's Field Marshal Montgomery. British units, who were at the time resting and re-equipping, were hastily rearmed and moved into action at short notice. However, at the time it was decided for reasons of Allied unity that the Bulge should be thought of as an all-American show, and matters were not helped by the personal and national rivalries of senior commanders and Monty's own style, which may have been strategic but was certainly not always tactful. Thus, Britain's part in the campaign was played down almost to the point where it seemed they were not there. Now matters concerning those who were there have been brought out by this prolific author who took part in the campaign as a young soldier before beginning a post-war career which has seen him produce over 200 military titles.

His account should not be seen as a complete history of the campaign; while the overall picture is painted and some specific incidents told in detail, it concentrates on the part played by Monty and troops under his direction. Some matters are mentioned which will require the reader to look in other accounts to understand them, which still leaves a lot to be covered here. If there is one criticism of this book, it is that it cannot go into great detail in such a small space. To tell the story of those who have not been covered fully elsewhere really deserves a longer work, though the accounts of those at the very top, including Monty and the major American commanders,

will help with a more full understanding of events.

Personal accounts are used throughout to bring the narrative alive, as do some small maps and several photos. Publicity is a theme which is much debated, with brief pen-portraits of American commanders, which may be at odds with the image created and fostered by their own publicists at the time. Matters such as the growing shortage of trained manpower on both sides, friction between the Allies, and considerations of the political leaders highlight themes which should be remembered.

In the end, I found the account did not include enough detail to make it as good a tribute to those who took part as they seem to deserve. However, it may help counter some long-held misconceptions and make the reader look more closely into the events in a new light.

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Achilles in Vietnam by Jonathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D., Touchstone, New York. 272 pages, \$13.00 paperback.

Achilles in Vietnam is an eye-opening study of the traumatic effects of combat on soldiers. It is both informative and moving in its vivid descriptions of why soldiers develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), how their characters are damaged, and how today's military leadership can reduce PTSD following future wars.

Dr. Shay is a psychiatrist whose patients are American combat veterans of the Vietnam War who have severe, chronic PTSD. He sees himself as a missionary, with the objective of preventing PTSD from afflicting soldiers in the future. He currently speaks across the country and writes in professional journals about his patients and their condition. His method in *Achilles in Vietnam* is to "learn about ourselves, using Homer like an ultraviolet lamp to see what is ordinarily invisible." To do this, he alternates between the accounts of his patients and the characters in *The Iliad* to compare what each experienced and the effects it had on their respective characters.

Dr. Shay begins by examining, for both Vietnam veterans and Homer's characters, the ways in which these men were transformed. This provides an explanation of the triggers for PTSD. He then discusses a myriad of factors, including how we view our enemies, deprivation of food and sleep, friendly fire, equipment failure, and attribution of blame. Finally, he explains the diagnosis of PTSD, healing of the veterans, and gives several recommendations.

The great strength of *Achilles in Vietnam* is the detailed, first-person accounts from the veterans themselves. They are shocking. You don't want to believe they are true. Yet, you know they are. In one account, a tanker talks about dismounting his tank to clear the ground around it. A crewmate volunteers to do the task for him and the narrator returns to the

tank. "And [he]'s probably fifteen feet away. And when he jumped, he jumped ... ah-WUHH... He jumped on a mine. And there was nothing left of him. ... And when you're on a tank, it's like a closeness you never had before. It's closer than your mother and father, closer than your brother or sister, or whoever you're closest with in your family.... Because you get three guys that are on that tank, and you're stuck together. You're there. It should have been me. I jumped first. It didn't blow me up. Sa-a-ame spot. Same spot. Same exact spot."

Shay's account is saturated with such reports. He gives the reader a very real sense of what his patients have gone through. Each incident demonstrates a particular cause or effect of PTSD. He further relates detailed accounts of what life is like for these veterans today. These men cannot maintain relationships. They cannot hold jobs. They exist on the fringes of society. This hits home when you come to accept that they have a disorder that came about because of their wartime experiences.

When you read *Achilles in Vietnam*, keep in mind the author's point of view. He has no military experience and sees everything from

his patients' perspective. Several times I started to dismiss his claims as unreasonable. He puts words in the mouths of the unit leadership. He insinuates that the government purposely gave these men faulty equipment. His arguments are one-sided and border on self-righteous. But, remember that those claims are based upon very real accounts from very real soldiers. These veterans believed they spoke the truth. Their perceptions are their realities and that is very relevant.

When Dr. Shay addresses his many concerns about ways that PTSD comes about, he uses a problem-discussion-recommendation format. Many of his recommendations, however, don't serve today's Army terribly well. Most are very general and not obvious in their potential implementation. Two notable exceptions are his recommendation to employ a unit, rather than an individual, replacement policy and suggestions on several methods for handling a unit's grief over fallen comrades. For example, Dr. Shay advocates allowing something as simple as a unit stand-down to commemorate the loss of a soldier. Give the soldier's buddies a chance to say a few words. Let one of the surviving peers accompany the deceased soldier's body to the rear. These acts serve to treat the dead

with respect and allow the survivors to grieve properly. Thwarted grief is one of the potential causes of PTSD.

I have mentioned that the author does not do a great job of making recommendations to today's leaders. Perhaps Dr. Shay is not qualified to do so. However, he is more than qualified to speak on behalf of the thousands of veterans who suffer with damaged characters as a result of their wartime experiences. Perhaps it is *our* job as leaders in today's Army to figure how to solve these problems.

This is not a book to read for enjoyment. This is a book to read for professional development. Once past the shock of the real-life accounts, you will find yourself angry about many things. You will be angry at the situations. You will be angry with these men's leaders. You will be angry with the author. But you will also start thinking of things you would do in your unit now and in the next war to make sure these things don't happen to your soldiers.

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New Game's Realism Makes You Forget Some Limitations

BCT: Brigade Combat Team by ProSIM, \$22.95 (secure credit card transaction) from ProSIM website at www.cchono.com/~pproctor/bct.htm (demo also available at this site).

Requires IBM PC 133mhz Pentium, Windows 3.x or Windows 95, 16 MB RAM, Soundblaster 16 or comparable sound card.

Reviewed on IBM 133mhz Pentium with Windows 95, 48 MB RAM.

Haven't heard of this one? Not surprising. *BCT* is a tactical simulation of modern ground combat based on the Army's Janus simulation. Written by an active duty Army field artillery officer, *BCT* is one of the two most realistic tactical simulations I have ever played. *BCT* stands out for several reasons, not all of them related to game-play: it is sold as a file download over the internet, the author maintains a presence on-line and responds to suggestions for improvement, and it's just a great game!

BCT is a real-time simulation of combined arms warfare. The game pits two opposing forces of up to brigade/regimental size against each other in simulated combat. Just as in modern land warfare, the player fights with and against units consisting of a wide variety

of vehicles. These include armor, infantry, artillery, engineers, air defense, and aircraft.

All Battlefield Operating Systems are present and functional in *BCT*: GSR radar detects the enemy as he approaches, Q36 radar finds his artillery for counter-battery fire by MLRS, VOLCANO minelayers deploy minefields during the battle, FOX NBC recon vehicles detect enemy chemical strikes, tanks with mine plows breach obstacles, etc. The battlefield is a digitized elevation map of actual terrain detailed to contour intervals of 1m for line of sight calculations. Some of the battlefields on which you will fight include the National Training Center, Kuwait, and North Korea.

The learning curve of *BCT* is quite steep, but once you get the hang of the interface, it is quite enjoyable. While it is a real-time simulation, you can pause the action to give you sufficient time to issue orders to all of your units. You can also accelerate time to get to the action quickly. Each scenario begins with an actual operations order, complete with operational graphics and situational template. Scenarios typically begin with the reconnaissance phase of the battle, which is also a nice touch of realism. In the larger scenarios it is sometimes difficult to follow the action, because while contact generates a text message and the appropriate graphics and sound ef-

fects, if you are looking at another portion of the battlefield, you sometimes miss events.

BCT's availability over the internet for roughly half the cost of a typical computer game is also an important aspect of the game that I hope catches on. The only drawback is that there is no game manual to sit down and read before or during play. Considering the quality of many game manuals today, this may not be so bad. The quality of *BCT's* on-line help is not as good as the game itself, nor is it complete. This makes finding information awkward. The author has promised a more complete downloadable text version of the manual sometime in the future.

BCT is at best a diamond in the rough at this point; while it is a highly realistic simulation, it has some serious limitations as a potential training aid. It does not have a scenario editor, you can only play the U.S. side, and the scenarios available are limited. The author promises to address these issues in future versions. Once these functions are added, *BCT* has great potential for use as a CPX tool over networked computers. I recommend *BCT* to anyone who wants a highly realistic modern ground combat simulation. It has potential, and is definitely worth the price.

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